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We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive 
compensation contracts and, in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance 
measures in CEO compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher 
takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put 
more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (return on assets) than on stock-
based performance measures (market returns).  In additional tests, we further find that CEO 
compensation in these firms has lower variance and a higher proportion of cash (versus 
stock-based) compensation.  We further find that CEOs’ incentives (measured as changes in 
CEO annual wealth, which includes changes in the value of CEOs’ equity holdings, in 
addition to yearly compensation) do not vary across governance structures. These findings 
are consistent with CEOs in firms with high takeover protection and where they have more 
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Governance structures have a strong influence on CEO compensation.They 
determine the company’s exposure to the market for corporate control through their policy 
decisions (Jensen, 1993; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) and therefore how contracts 
influence CEO behavior. Internal governance bodies are also directly responsible for the 
design of CEO compensation contracts and this contracting process is one of company 
directors’ main tasks.  Core et al. (1999), using survey-based compensation data, provide 
initial evidence on the relationship between governance and CEO compensation. Their 
findings indicate that governance structures subject to more influence from the CEO are 
correlated with higher levels of CEO compensation. They also find that these governance 
structures are correlated with worse stock returns and worse operating performance. The 
authors argue that this evidence is consistent with the presence of agency costs associated 
with weaker governance, where the CEO exerts his bargaining power to extract rents at the 
expense of shareholders.  
 
While existing evidence indicates that certain governance structures allow CEOs to 
extract excess rents, it remains unknown how these rents might be extracted. The objective 
of this study is to examine whether the design of CEO compensation contracts varies across 
governance structures. We focus on one aspect of contract design: the implicit weight on 
various performance measures. CEOs may want to increase the weight that the contract puts 
on more controllable measures, thus reducing variability in actual compensation, raising the 
likelihood of achieving target objectives, and increasing the rents that the CEO is able to 
capture. From the CEO’s point of view, controllable measures have a better signal-to-noise 
ratio, which reduces the uncertainty about outcomes, and a more transparent association 
between certain types of effort and measured outcome, thus making it easier for the agent to 
exert the type and level of effort required to achieve the objectives. From the shareholders’ 
point of view, these measures are incomplete—leaving out certain types of effort relevant to 
the value of the firm—and incongruent—weighting the various types of effort differently 
from what shareholders would otherwise choose. Thus, these contracts favor controllable 
measures at the expense of noisier measures that enhance the completeness and congruency 
of the contract.  
 
_____________ 
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We focus on two main classes of performance measures: accounting-based 
measures of performance (return on assets) and stock-based measures (stock returns); and 
we examine whether accounting-based measures—arguably more controllable on average—
have higher implicit weights and / or, conversely, whether stock-based measures—less 
controllable—receive lower weights as governance favors CEO influence.  
 
Previous accounting literature has studied the implicit weights of performance 
measures on the design of CEO compensation contracts (Lambert, 2001), such as the 
relevance of accounting numbers (Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Sloan, 1993) and non-
financial performance measures (Bushman et al., 1996; Ittner et al., 1997; Dávila and 
Venkatachalam, 2004) beyond stock returns. The evidence indicates that the implicit 
weights vary with the ability of the various measures to congruently reflect a CEO’s multi-
dimensional effort while minimizing the risk imposed upon him.  Accordingly, the weight 
on a particular measure increases as its relative noise decreases (Banker and Datar, 1989) 
and its ability to reflect CEO effort increases (Baber et al., 1996). The findings are grounded 
on agency theory (Holmstrom, 1979), which predicts the relevance to contracting of 
measures other than stock returns based on noisiness (Banker et al., 1989), congruency 
(Feltham and Xie, 1994), efficiency (Bushman and Indjejikian, 1993), and trading (Baiman 
and Verrecchia, 1995) arguments. These studies typically focus on cash compensation and, 
in some cases, stock-based compensation; but they ignore changes in the value of the CEO’s 
portfolio of equity-based holdings. When the change in the value of the portfolio is added to 
the annual pay to obtain the CEO annual wealth—a necessary step to be consistent with 
theory predictions that examine managers’ incentive structure—some of these findings lose 
much of their significance (Core et al., 2003).  
 
These studies aim at understanding CEOs’ incentives; therefore, the change in 
value of a CEO’s portfolio is a relevant piece of information to fully reflect the incentive 
structure that managers face. In contrast, the effect of governance on the design of CEO 
contracts is grounded on the CEO’s ability to exercise power. This favorable bargaining 
position can be leveraged through the design of the compensation contract for the period, 
but does not influence the change in value of the beginning-of-the-year portfolio over the 
period. Even if changes in the value of the portfolio dominate the manager’s incentive 
structure, he can only exercise his bargaining power in negotiating the structure of his 
annual pay and, in particular, the implicit weights of the various performance measures.  
 
In contrast to the bargaining power argument, governance structures where the 
CEO has more influence and is better protected against takeovers may improve long-term 
firm performance. Because these structures offer better protection from the market for 
corporate control (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985) and reward long-term value 
maximization (Fuller & Jensen, 2002), they enhance managers’ incentives to make firm-
specific investments in their human capital and have a longer-term horizon for their 
investment decisions (Stein, 1988). Dimitrov and Jain (2003) give evidence consistent with 
this “positive entrenchment” argument. Also consistent with this argument, Smart and 
Zutter (2003) find that dual-class structures experience significantly less IPO underpricing. 
This argument relies on the incentive structure facing the CEO (rather than on his 
bargaining power) and, following Core et al. (2003), we also examine the variation of the 
implicit weights of accounting-based and market-based performance measures across 
governance structures on changes in CEO annual wealth (rather than on CEO pay).  
 
We use 6,536 observations of changes in CEO pay—cash and non-cash 
components—and CEO annual wealth for 1,879 CEOs during the years from 1993 through 
2002, and a proxy of governance structure that combines various aspects associated with 
it—including anti-takeover protection and characteristics of the Board of Directors such as 




chairman. We find that the implicit weight on accounting performance measures when 
changes in CEO pay are examined increases as the firm has more protection against 
takeovers and the CEO has more influence on internal governance. The results are robust to 
using change in return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and earnings per share 
(EPS) as the accounting performance measure. Furthermore, we also find that not only is the 
level of governance associated with the weighting of performance measures in CEO 
compensation, but also that changes in governance are associated with changes in the 
weight of the accounting-based performance measures. We find no difference in the implicit 
weight of accounting and stock based measures across governance structures when looking 
at changes in CEO annual wealth. 
 
The higher weight that accounting measures receive within certain types of 
governance structures suggests that the variance in compensation may also vary across these 
different structures (Core et al., 1999). Because accounting performance measures are on 
average more controllable and less noisy than stock based measures, increasing their weight 
may reduce the overall variability of the compensation package. Consistent with this 
conjecture, we find that firms with more protection against takeovers and where the CEO 
has more influence on internal governance also have lower variance in CEO compensation. 
Finally, we also find that these governance structures are associated with a lower proportion 
of the equity-based component in CEO compensation. These results are also broadly 
consistent with the agency costs associated with CEO bargaining power.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses related 
research on governance and develops our main hypothesis. Section 3 describes the research 
design, variable measurement, and sample selection.  Section 4 presents the results related 
to our main hypothesis and additional results on the effect of governance structures upon the 




2. Governance Structure and the design of CEO Contracts 
 
Corporate governance is a combination of external and internal mechanisms. 
Takeover provisions and the market for corporate control belong to the first group, whereas 
the Board of Directors and the presence of blockholders are part of the second group. The 
two types of mechanisms are complementary as both are needed to achieve the desired 
effects (Cremers and Nair, 2005).  
 
The appropriate level of governance is a function of firm characteristics as different 
types of firms need different levels of governance. For instance, Alchian and Demsetz 
(1972) argue that some entrenchment may deter outsiders from incorrectly replacing a 
competent incumbent manager. Entrenchment also enhances managers’ incentives to make 
firm-specific human capital investments (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985) and focuses 
managers’ attention on long-term value maximization rather than short-term stock price 
movements (Knoeber, 1986; Fuller & Jensen, 2002). Consistent with these arguments, 
Brickley et al. (1994) find a positive stock price reaction to the adoption of poison pills 
when the board has a majority of outside directors.  
 
However, empirical evidence also highlights problems associated with 
entrenchment. Core et al. (1999) find that Board of Director characteristics associated with 
CEO influence—including the CEO’s holding the chairman position, board size, directors 
appointed by the CEO, gray outside directors, old directors, and busy directors—are 
correlated with higher levels of CEO compensation after controlling for economic 




compensation, based on the governance structure of the firm, is negatively correlated with 
stock returns one year, three years and five years ahead. Yermack (1996) finds that firm 
value decreases with board size. Rosentein and Wyatt (1990) find a positive stock price 
reaction to the announcement of the appointment of a new external board member. Cyert et 
al. (2002) report a negative association between stock ownership by a large shareholder and 
the compensation committee, on the one hand, and the level of salary, equity, and 
discretionary compensation, on the other. Similarly, companies that adopt particular 
provisions such as various types of anti-takeover charter amendments also report higher 
CEO compensation in the year of adoption and the subsequent three years compared to 
companies that do not adopt such provisions (Borokhovich et al., 1997). Cremers and Nair 
(2005) find that firms with a high level of takeover vulnerability and less CEO influence on 
governance outperform firms lacking either of these two mechanisms.  
 
While this latter evidence suggests that CEOs in firms with higher anti-takeover 
protection and CEO influence on governance receive higher compensation, it is unclear how 
their contracts are designed to capture these rents. From a contracting perspective, the most 
efficient solution to extract rents is to increase the CEO’s salary, which does not impose 
additional risk on the manager. If bargaining power is exercised through salary increase, 
then we do not expect to observe any difference in the implicit weight of performance 
measures across governance structures. But simply increasing salary or bonus without a link 
to firm performance may draw attention from outsiders and expose managers to reputation 
costs that may damage their human capital. Pay for performance appears as an effective way 
of capturing these rents without drawing attention. Whether this is the case remains an 
empirical question. Another possibility to leverage pay for performance as a way to extract 
additional rents is to tie managers’ compensation to observable luck, where CEOs are 
rewarded for positive performance due to events beyond their control, but are spared from 
being punished for negative events. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) examine this 
argument and find that weaker boards reward but do not punish CEOs for observable 
changes in firm performance that are beyond the control of the CEO (luck) to a larger 
extent. Having a large shareholder on the board reduces this “pay for luck” by between 23 
and 33 percent; shorter CEO tenure, smaller boards, and a smaller fraction of insiders also 
reduce “pay for luck.”  
 
An alternative to exercising this bargaining power is for CEOs to influence the 
design of favorable contracts that put more weight on performance measures with lower 
variance that they can control more readily; that is, measures with better signal to noise ratio 
(Banker and Datar, 1989). Putting more weight on controllable measures reduces variability 
in actual compensation, eases the likelihood of achieving target objectives, and increases the 
rents that the CEO is able to capture. Empirical evidence indicates that stock returns are 
noisier (have higher variance) and receive higher weight in compensation contracts than 
accounting returns (Core et al., 2003). Because exposure to risk increases with the variance 
of the performance measure and its weight, managers are better off increasing the weight of 
accounting based measures rather than stock based measures. Because the bargaining power 
is exercised over the contract, the prediction is not informative about the CEO’s incentives, 












3. Research Design 
 
3.1. Empirical Specification 
 
Previous empirical work indicates that CEO compensation is associated with 
market (stock returns) and accounting (i.e., return on assets) measures of performance (Core 
et al., 2003; Bushman and Smith, 2001; Bushman et al., 1998, 2001; Kaplan, 1994; Sloan, 
1993; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Lambert et al., 1987). The null hypothesis in this study is 
that observed governance structures do not affect the weights of these performance 
measures. Therefore, only economic determinants of contract design identified in this 
stream of research should explain cross-sectional differences in the weights of accounting 
and stock performance measures. In particular, governance structures should not be 
significant in explaining these weights.  
 
Our model regresses the change in CEO compensation on our two performance 
measures: changes in stock price (stock returns) and changes in accounting returns. 
Empirically, the cross-sectional variation in the weights of the performance measures can be 
examined using a changes specification that suffers from fewer omitted correlated variables’ 
problems—a common threat to levels’ specifications in compensation studies (Murphy, 
1998). A changes specification minimizes the effect of omitted variables that remain 
relatively constant over a period of time (one year) such as industry variables and firm-
specific factors including firm strategy, CEO quality and level of governance.  
 
We control for variables that have been found to affect the weights of these two 
performance measures. Baber et al. (1996) find that the association between CEO 
compensation and stock returns is larger for firms with a larger opportunity set. This is 
consistent with stock prices better capturing the intangible value of future opportunities 
compared to accounting returns that only reflect current value generated.  Following Smith 
and Watts (1992), we use the book-to-market ratio at the beginning of the year as our proxy 
for the firm’s investment opportunities. We also control for the relative noise of our two sets 
of performance measures. Because the relative weights on performance measures are a 
decreasing function of the relative noise in the performance measures (Banker and Datar, 
1989), we expect relative noise to affect the cross-sectional weights on accounting and stock 
measures. We use the ratio of the accounting-based performance measure variance to the 
returns-based performance measure variance as the proxy for relative noise (Sloan, 1993). 
Finally, we control for CEO ownership because the CEO’s exposure to stock returns 
through stock ownership may affect the weighting of performance measures.  
 
Because governance (as well as growth opportunities, relative noise and CEO 
ownership) is hypothesized to affect CEO compensation through the differential weighting 
of performance measures in the CEO contract rather than CEO compensation directly, we 
model its effect through interaction terms between our governance proxy (growth 
opportunities, relative noise and CEO ownership) and our two measures of firm 
performance after controlling for these variables’ direct effects. We estimate the following 
empirical model, where the symbol ∆ denotes change:  
 
∆ compensationt = β1 * stock returnst + β2 * ∆ accounting measuret + β3 * governance 
 
+ β4 * ∆ accounting measuret * governance+ β5 * stock returnst * governance 
 
+ Σ βi * control variablest + Σ βj * stock returnst * control variablest 
 




If any of the two coefficients, β4 and β5, on the interaction between governance and 
the two performance measures is significant, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of 
governance having an effect on the design of compensation contracts. Moreover, if 
governance structure is associated with an increase in the weight of accounting measures at 
the expense of stock returns then the coefficient on the interaction term between governance 
and accounting measures (β4) will be positive and / or the coefficient on stock returns times 
governance (β5) will be negative. Following previous findings, we expect the interaction 
between accounting and growth opportunities to be negative and / or the interaction between 
stock returns and growth opportunities to be positive (that is, CEO contracts in firms with 
more growth opportunities put less weight on accounting numbers and / or more weight on 
stock returns). We also expect the coefficient for the interaction term between accounting 
(stock returns) and accounting noise relative to stock returns noise to be negative (positive). 
Contracts for CEOs with larger ownership are expected to put more weight on accounting 
measures because of their exposure through their stock holdings to stock returns.  
 
The specification is subject to several caveats. Following prior empirical research 
in the field, we treat governance structure as exogenous to the design of CEO contracts. This 
assumption is consistent with CEO compensation having no effect on governance structure; 
thus, with the assumption that governance is defined prior to the decision on how to design 
CEO compensation. To the extent that this assumption deviates from practice, our results 
may be affected by a simultaneous equation bias. However, empirical evidence shows that 
there is little time-series variation in the level of governance within a firm (Gompers et al., 
2003), therefore the likelihood of changes in compensation affecting the level of governance 
is very small. Accordingly, our specification uses changes in compensation.  To further limit 
this potential effect, we also run the specification of changes in compensation on changes in 
governance that avoids the impact of any variable that may be correlated in the cross-section 
but uncorrelated over time. Finally, to reduce the potential impact of the correlation between 
governance and economic characteristics of the firm, we use a two-stage procedure where 
we replace the governance variable (to be defined below) with the residuals from a 
regression of governance on economic characteristics of the firm. We also complement our 
main findings with additional tests that extend the effect of governance on the design of 
compensation contracts beyond the weighting of performance measures. Specifically, we 




3.2. Variable Measurement 
 
Research in CEO compensation typically focuses on two measures of CEO 
compensation that are also the variables in this paper.  The first one is “cash pay”, defined 
as the sum of annual salary plus bonus.  The second measure adds non-cash items—
including stock options, restricted stock, long-term incentive plans, and all other annual 
compensation—to “cash pay.” We label this latter variable as “total pay.” We use the log 
transformation of compensation to mitigate the influence of outliers and define the 
dependent variable in changes. Thus, the variable ∆log(compensation) is, alternatively, 
log(cash payt/cash payt-1) or log(total payt/total payt-1). It is more appropriate to use the 
second variable but we also report the results for the first one to make it comparable to 
earlier research. In our first set of tests we do not include the change in the CEO’s equity 
portfolio value in our measure of compensation because, as argued above, the CEO’s 
favorable bargaining position is exercised through the design of the compensation contract 
for the period, but his bargaining position does not influence the change in the value of 





We obtain compensation information directly from the ExecuComp database. 
ExecuComp values stock option grants using Black and Scholes. While this valuation has 
been used as best reflecting the value that executives put on these instruments, alternative 
valuations have been proposed. We also estimate stock option grants’ value using a 
modified valuation formula.  Specifically, we assume that the options are held 70% of the 
options’ time to maturity (Huddart, 1994). The inputs required to estimate this alternative 
value—number of options granted, exercise price, dividend yield, and time to maturity—are 
obtained from ExecuComp. We estimate volatility as the standard deviation of daily stock 
returns during the 120 days before the end of the fiscal year multiplied by 254 trading days 
of a typical year. Our conclusions are unaltered by this alternative stock option valuation 
method.  
 
We measure changes in stock price (Returns) as log(annual returnt + 1) using 
CRSP data. There is no consensus on a particular accounting measure of performance. 
Murphy (1998), using survey data, reports that most firms use at least one measure of 
accounting profits, either as the dollar value of profits, on a per-share basis, as a margin, or 
as a return. Researchers have also used different accounting measures of performance: 
return on equity (Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Baber et al., 1996), return on assets (Core and 
Larcker, 2002; Sloan, 1993), and earnings per share (Core el al., 2003; Sloan, 1993). We use 
the change in return on assets (∆ROAt)—where ROA is operating income divided by 
average total assets—as our main accounting performance measure. We use Compustat to 
obtain the accounting data. 
 
We measure governance structure using an approach similar to the one used by 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). Specifically, we develop a composite governance 
variable (TotGov) that incorporates the level of anti-takeover protection (external 
governance) and several characteristics of the board’s structure (internal governance). This 
variable combines the following four governance proxies:  
 
1)  The first external governance proxy is the takeover protection index developed 
by Gompers et al. (2003). Even though these researchers interpret their index 
as a measure of shareholders’ rights, we interpret it, following Cremers and 
Nair (2005), as a measure of takeover vulnerability. Using data compiled by 
the Investors Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and state takeover law 
data, Gompers et al. construct an index for each firm in their sample by adding 
one point for every provision that reduces takeover vulnerability.
1 Higher 
values of this index are associated with more protection against takeovers.
2 
Cremers and Nair (2005) also use a narrower alternative takeover index that 
only accounts for three components of the IRRC data shown to be critical to 
                                                 
1 Gompers et al. (2003) examine 24 provisions: anti-greenmail, blank check preferred stock, business 
combination laws, bylaw and charter amendment limitations, classified board, compensation plans with 
change in control provisions, director indemnification contracts, control share cash-out laws, cumulative 
voting requirements, director’s duties, fair price requirements, golden parachutes, director indemnification, 
limitations on director liability, pension parachutes, poison pills, secret ballot, executive severance agreements, 
silver parachutes, special meeting requirements, supermajority requirements, unequal voting rights and 
limitations on action by written consent. 
2 Our data covers the period 1993-2002. The IRRC data is only available for 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 
and 2002. Gompers et al. (2003) report that for the majority of firms there is little time-series variation in the 
index. Taking advantage of this fact, like Cremers and Nair (2005), we align the index for 1993 with CEO 
compensation data for 1993 and 1994, the governance index for 1995 with CEO compensation data for 1995, 
1996 and 1997, the governance index for 1998 with CEO compensation data for 1998and 1999, the 
governance index for 2000 with CEO compensation data for 2000 and 2001, and the governance index for 
2002 with CEO compensation data for 2002. In 7.65% of the cases some firms do not have a governance index 





takeovers. They report that their results do not change and conclude that there 
are no systematic biases in the Gompers et al. index, and that it can be 
correctly interpreted as a measure of takeover protection. 
 
2)  However, this anti-takeover  protection index does not capture information on 
internal governance, such as board characteristics. Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998, 2003) argue that the main factor affecting a board’s effectiveness is its 
independence from the CEO. Expanding their argument, we include an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is also the chairman of 
the board and zero otherwise. The CEO has more influence on governance 
when the same person holds the titles of CEO and chairman.  
 
3)  As a second proxy for internal governance, we include an additional variable 
that contains the proportion of top executives that serve on the board. A higher 
proportion of executives on the board is associated with higher CEO influence 
on governance.  
 
4)  Finally, Adams (2000) and Vafeas (1999) suggest that the number of board 
meetings is a good proxy for the directors’ monitoring effort. We include this 
variable, where a higher value is associated with higher board influence.  
 
Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), we define the composite governance 
variable by taking the unweighted average of the standardized variables.
3  
 
Our proxy for investment opportunities is the book-to-market ratio (B/M). We 
follow Smith and Watts’ (1992) definition and estimate this variable as the ratio of book 
value of assets to market value of assets measured at the beginning of the period. The 
market value of assets equals the market value of equity plus the book value of total 
liabilities. Like in Sloan (1993), the proxy to control for the relative noise in the 
performance measures is defined as the ratio of the variance of the accounting-based to 
the  returns-based performance measures, Var(∆ROA)/Var(Returns). To compute the 
variances we impose five consecutive annual observations spanning years t-4 to t. We 
define CEO ownership (CEOshares) as the percentage of shares owned by the CEO.   
Finally, we control for industry effects and for secular trends by adding two-digit SIC 
industry and year indicator variables. To mitigate the influence of outliers, we set the lower- 





The final specification after controlling for industry and year is as follows: 
 
∆log(compensation) =  
 
  β0 + β1 Returns + β2 ∆ROA + β3 TotGov + β4 ∆ROA*TotGov + β5 Returns*TotGov  
+ β6 B/M + β7 ∆ROA*B/M + β8 Returns*B/M + β9 Var(∆ROA)/Var(Returns) 
+ β10 ∆ROA*Var(∆ROA)/Var(Returns) + β11 Returns*Var(∆ROA)/Var(Returns)  
+ β12 CEOshares + β13 ∆ROA* CEOshares + β14 Returns* CEOshares  
+ β15 Industry + β16Year + ε 
                                                 
3 The number of meetings is reverse coded to obtain TotGov. Like Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), we use 
unit weights to construct TotGov, following the recommendations of Grice and Harris (1998), who find 
that  unit-weighted composites exhibit better psychometric properties than alternative weighting schemes. 
Higher values of Totgov are expected to be associated with governance structures with higher takeover 




If CEOs exert their power to influence their compensation contracts so that more 
weight is given to accounting-based performance measures which they can better control, 
we predict that β4 will be positive and / or β5 will be negative or zero. If the presence of 
greater investment opportunities (low B/M) makes returns more sensitive to CEO actions, 
then we predict that β7 will be positive and / or β8 will be negative. If the relative weights on 
the performance measures are a decreasing function of the relative noise in the performance 
measures, we predict that β10 will be negative and / or β11 will be positive. Finally, if CEOs 
with a higher percentage of ownership are exposed to stock returns to a larger extent, we 
expect β13 to be positive and β14 to be negative. 
 
 
3.3. Sample selection 
 
Our initial sample is drawn from Compustat’s Execucomp database. We select 
CEOs with compensation data to construct our regression variables and with at least three 
years in office to ensure that when we take changes, the compensation for year t-1 
corresponds to an entire year.
4 This criterion also ensures that the CEO has had the 
opportunity to gain bargaining power and exert it, if he chose to do so. This criterion yields 
an initial sample of 8,073 CEO-year observations, covering fiscal years 1993 to 2002. Lack 
of returns data in CRSP eliminates 998 observations. We also eliminate 60 observations due 
to missing Compustat accounting data items. Missing governance index data in IRRC 
eliminates 287 observations, and lack of board data in Execucomp reduces the sample by 
192 observations. The final sample consists of 6,536 CEO-year observations, corresponding 






In this section we present the main results relating governance to the use of 
accounting and stock-related measures in the design of CEO compensation.  
 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics on the various variables in the research.  Panel A 
summarizes the various components of CEO compensation. For each component of 
compensation, Panel A provides the overall statistics as well as the statistics when the 
sample is partitioned into a “high takeover protection and high CEO influence” (HPI) 
governance group and a “low takeover protection and low CEO influence” 
(LPI) governance group at the median of the governance variable (TotGov). On average, 
LPI governance firms have lower cash pay and higher equity pay than HPI governance 
firms. The average cash pay in our sample is $1.337 million, the average equity pay is 
$2.416 million, and total pay is $4.240 million on average, although the distributions are 
skewed.  These summary statistics are consistent with previous studies using a comparable 
time period (Core et al., 2003). Panel B presents descriptive statistics on the two definitions 
of our dependent variable.   
 
Panel C summarizes governance related variables. Firms in the sample have 
adopted a median of 9 out of 24 provisions that increase anti-takeover protection as 
compiled by the IRRC, consistent with Gompers et al. (2003). The median number of board 
meetings is 7. The average percentage of executives on the board is 34%, consistent with 
                                                 




previous evidence on a similar period (Harvey and Shrieves, 2001).  The CEO is also 
chairperson in 79.9% of the observations.  
 
Finally, Panel D summarizes other variables in the research design. The median 
change in ROA is 0, while the median return is 8.5%. The average of the standard deviation 
of ∆ROA is 0.040 compared to 0.431 for returns, consistent with stock returns being noisier 
(Lambert and Larcker, 1987). The average book-to-market ratio and sales growth are 0.65 
and 10.2%, respectively. The CEOs in our sample own 3% of the company on average, 
consistent with previous evidence (Yermack, 1995), and have been in office for an average 
of 10.6 years; and the mean (median) value of the stock options exercised annually is $1.90 
(0) million. 
 
Table 2 contains the Pearson correlations among variables of interest. Firms with 
higher book-to-market have larger changes in cash compensation and a higher (lower) 
proportion of cash (equity-based) pay to total pay, consistent with firms facing a constrained 
opportunity set (fewer investment opportunities), putting more weight on short-term 
incentives and relying to a smaller extent on equity compensation. Total governance 
(TotGov) is positively correlated with the percentage of cash pay over total pay, suggesting 
that governance structures with high takeover protection and CEO influence are associated 
with higher (lower) reliance on cash (equity-based) compensation. Untabulated results also 
show that this governance structure is also associated with CEO tenure and firm size. This 
latter correlation suggests that governance may deteriorate with firm size and, interestingly, 
it extends to all the components of our governance proxy. 
 
Untabulated results also indicate that the level of fixed cash compensation (salary) 
on average is higher for the high anti-takeover, high CEO influence on governance firms 
($0.651 vs. $0.647 million), although the difference is not statistically significant. The 
medians are also not significantly different. This result does not provide support for 
the hypothesis that the easiest way to extract rents is for the CEO to influence the contract to 
increase his salary.  
 
 
4.2. Governance and the weighting of performance measures in CEO contracts 
 
Table 3 presents the results testing the hypothesized association between 
governance and the structure of CEO compensation. We report results for our two measures 
of CEO compensation as dependent variables. The first column contains the change in cash 
pay and the second column reports change in total pay, which includes non-cash in addition 
to cash compensation. The coefficients for year and industry dummies are not reported. If 
governance affects the weighting of the various performance measures, then at least one of 
the coefficients on the interaction terms between governance and performance measures will 
be significant.  
 
We find that the interaction between governance and performance (∆ROA * 
TotGov) is positive and significant for our two compensation variables. Companies with 
governance structures that have more anti-takeover protection and CEO influence (higher 
values of TotGov) put more weight on accounting performance measures. The sign for the 
interaction term between stock returns and governance (Returns * TotGov) is in 
the expected direction but not significant.  
 
These findings are consistent with CEOs exercising their bargaining power through 
the design of the compensation contract and in particular by increasing the weight of 
accounting performance measures. Alternatively, these findings also suggest that CEOs in 




be protected from market myopia, allowing them to concentrate on long-term value 
maximization. With optimal protection from takeovers, CEOs have lower incentives to 
manipulate earnings and, therefore, accounting measures contain less noise and become a 
better performance indicator on which to base compensation. Section 4.4 tests the 
robustness of this second argument.  
 
As expected, we find that both accounting and stock-based performance measures 
are positively correlated with change in compensation in both specifications. We also find 
that a higher book-to-market ratio (i.e., firms with a smaller investment opportunity set) is 
positively associated with changes in cash pay and negatively with total pay, reflecting the 
increasing relevance of equity pay as the investment opportunity set increases. Consistent 
with prior research, we also find that firms with higher book-to-market ratio weight 
accounting measures more (Baber et al., 1996), but only for cash compensation. Also 
consistent with prior results, we find that accounting measures receive significantly more 
weight on cash compensation as their noisiness relative to stock returns decreases (Lambert 
et al., 1987; Sloan, 1993).
5  
 
We also test the robustness of our results to alternative measures of accounting 
performance; in particular to the change in return on equity (∆ROEt)—where ROE is net 
income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by average common 
equity—and the change in earnings per share scaled by beginning-of-the-period stock price 
(∆EPSt  /P t-1)—where EPS is diluted earnings per share before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations. We also examine the sensitivity of our conclusions to dropping 
those observations for which we interpolated the governance index (7.65% of the 
observations did not have a governance index for all the sample years).
6  We repeat our tests 
using lagged values of the governance proxies to allow for the CEO to exert his bargaining 
power the year before. Our inferences remain unaltered by each of these tests.  
 
The previous results examine the impact of governance upon the weights of 
different performance measures. For different governance regimes, we find that these 
weights vary as hypothesized. As an additional robustness test, we modify the previous 
specification and replace TotGov with its change (∆TotGov). The power of this test is much 
lower than our main regression. First, we do not have yearly measures for some of the 
variables that define TotGov; in particular, governance provisions captured in the anti-
takeover protection index are only updated every two or more years. So our estimation of 
changes in governance is underestimated. Second, it relies on the assumption that changes in 
governance are rapidly translated into a change in the design of the CEO contract—within 
the same year in which governance changes take place. While such a rapid exercise of 
bargaining power may be true in certain companies, it may take longer to translate into 
contracting in other companies. In other words, while levels are informative about the on-
going association between the two variables of interest, changes in governance also inform 
about (and assume) how quickly the expected association happens and how fast CEOs exert 
their newly gained power (as captured in the change in the governance proxy). On the other 
hand, a changes specification controls for potential omitted variables correlated with 
governance but with different time series properties. Table 4 reports the results. We find that 
contemporaneous changes in governance are associated with an increase in the weight given 
to accounting measures. The result is robust for the change in total pay.
7 This finding 
reinforces the evidence on the relevance of governance to the design of CEO compensation 
                                                 
5 This result is consistent with previous research. However, as Core et al. (2003) point out, it should not be 
interpreted as a confirmation of theory predictions (Holstrom, 1979; Banker and Datar, 1989). For this to be a 
test of that theory, the dependent variable should be the change in wealth (total pay plus the change in the 
CEO’s equity portfolio). 
6 As described in footnote 3. 




contracts, but also indicates that the effect of a redistribution in the power structure between 
the CEO and shareholders is reflected (on average) in the design of the contract soon after 
governance changes.  
 
We also use a two-stage procedure to control for the possibility that different firm 
characteristics require different levels of governance. In the first stage, we run a regression 
of TotGov on a vector of firm characteristics: size (measured as the logarithm of assets), 
growth opportunities (measured as book-to-market), CEO tenure (measured as the number 
of years in office), logarithm of the age of the firm (in years), and the presence of large free 
cash flows together with low growth opportunities (as defined in section 4.3 below). We 
also include two-digit industry and year dummies to control for industry and secular trends. 
All the variables load significantly in the regression.
8 Then, we replace TotGov in our main 
regression with the residuals from the first-stage regression and use it as our proxy for the 
quality of governance after controlling for firm characteristics. The residuals capture 
the  variation in governance orthogonal to firm characteristics included in the first stage 
regression, that is, variation unaccounted for by these characteristics. The results from this 
two-stage model are consistent with the conclusions from Table 3.  
 
 
4.3. Governance and the mix of pay in CEO compensation contracts 
 
The evidence so far suggests that CEOs are able to exercise their bargaining power 
within certain governance structures and increase the weight of accounting measures. As 
argued in section 2, accounting measures are more controllable and this controllability has 
several attractive features from the CEO’s perspective. One of them is that accounting 
measures are less volatile than stock returns, which reduces the risk imposed upon the agent. 
An additional implication of our results in Table 3 is that by increasing the weight of less 
volatile measures, CEOs may be able to reduce the volatility of their overall compensation. 
We examine the empirical implications of this argument in Table 5. Panel A provides 
descriptive statistics on the standard deviation of our two proxies of pay—cash pay and total 
pay—as well as on their changes (our dependent variables in Table 3). As in Table 1, we 
partition the sample at the median of TotGov and compare the mean of the high takeover 
protection and CEO influence (HPI) and low takeover protection and CEO influence (LPI) 
sub-samples. For the total sample and each sub-sample, we estimate the standard deviation 
of time series compensation for those CEOs for whom we have four or more consecutive 
observations. For total pay, the mean standard deviation for HPI governance firms is 
significantly lower than for LPI governance firms. This result is also significant when 
examining the standard deviation of the changes in total pay. These significant differences 
are robust to using the value of TotGov at points in time other than three years in the CEO 
position.  
 
Panel B extends these descriptive statistics to a multivariate framework. In 
particular, it examines the relationship between the variation in change in compensation 
(rather than levels) and governance quality (TotGov) after controlling for variables that may 
affect this variation. In particular, we control for book-to-market because companies with 
larger investment opportunities may put more compensation at risk and thus increase its 
variation; we also control for size using the logarithm of assets, for CEO ownership, and for 
the variance of changes in accounting returns and stock returns. As in Panel A, we use the 
third year of a CEO’s consecutive observations to select our independent variables; the third 
year corresponds approximately to the middle of the period used to compute the standard 
deviation of the changes in compensation. The results are robust to choosing other years to 
select the independent variables. The results indicate that high takeover protection and CEO 
                                                 





influence on governance is associated with lower variation in change in total pay (but not in 
cash pay), suggesting that CEOs leverage their bargaining power in this governance 
situation by reducing the variability of their compensation.  
 
An alternative way in which CEOs may limit the variation in compensation is 
through the mix of types of pay. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 suggest that cash 
compensation is less volatile than equity compensation; in particular, the change in cash pay 
is smaller than the change in total pay. Thus, the variance in compensation may be reduced 
through a larger proportion of cash in the compensation mix. Table 6 examines this 
approach to designing CEO compensation contracts.  Panel A provides descriptive statistics 
following the structure in Table 1; it includes overall statistics and statistics with the sample 
split at the median of TotGov. The proportion of cash pay in total pay is significantly larger 
for HPI governance firms, and conversely the proportion of equity pay is significantly 
larger for LPI governance firms.  
 
Panel B presents the multivariate results. Our dependent variables are the 
proportion of cash pay, defined as log(cash pay / total pay), and the proportion of equity 
pay, defined as log(equity pay / total pay).  Equity pay is the sum of annual grants of stock 
options and restricted stock. We use the log transformation to reduce the influence of 
outliers.  
 
Because our dependent variables are levels rather than changes, in addition to the 
governance proxy (TotGov), we control for economic determinants that have been 
previously found to be associated with levels of pay. In particular, Smith and Watts (1992) 
suggest that a firm’s investment opportunity set is positively associated with equity 
incentives, since the presence of growth opportunities makes it more difficult to monitor 
managerial actions. In addition, options’ incentive and retention features are especially 
important for growth firms. Following Smith and Watts (1992), we control for the 
investment opportunity set using the book-to-market ratio (B/M) as previously defined. 
Firms with a smaller (larger) opportunity set are more likely to rely on short-term cash 
compensation (long-term equity-based compensation). We also include the growth in sales 
as an additional determinant of CEO pay in addition to being another proxy for the 
investment opportunity set (Baber et al., 1996).  
 
High free cash flow poses a problem for firms with low growth opportunities, since 
managers may invest the excess cash in negative net present value projects or engage in 
empire-building acquisitions. Jensen (1986) suggests that using stock-based compensation 
can mitigate this agency problem.  Following Lang et al. (1991) and Core and Guay (1999), 
our proxy to capture this determinant (Free cash flow problem) is the three-year average of 
[(operating cash flow minus preferred and common dividends)/total assets] if the book-to-
market ratio is greater than or equal to one—that is, if firms expected to have low growth 
opportunities—and zero otherwise.  
 
We control for the amount of options that the CEO exercised during the year using 
the fair value of the options exercised, because it is correlated with the amount of options 
granted and thus with equity pay (Core and Guay, 1999).  The number of years the CEO has 
been in office (CEO tenure) is another hypothesized determinant of compensation. 
However, its relationship to the compensation mix may be non-linear. On the one hand, 
Harvey and Shrieves (2001) find that CEOs with longer tenure and approaching retirement 
receive more compensation in cash. On the other hand, the proportion of equity increases 
with tenure because the uncertainty about the CEO’s ability is reduced, allowing firms to 
impose more risk on the CEO through equity compensation (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). 
We model this potential non-linearity by including the squared term for tenure. Finally, we 




We run two different specifications for the two different dependent variables: 
proportion of cash pay to total pay and proportion of equity pay to total pay. For our first 
dependent variable we use a linear regression with robust standard errors. Because of the 
significant number of zeros in our second dependent variable (21%), ordinary least squares’ 
regression may lead to biased results due to the self-selection problem associated with firms 
not choosing the level of equity pay at random. To mitigate this problem, we use a Heckman 
procedure (Heckman, 1979), a two-stage procedure that first estimates a selection model 




The first column reports the results for proportion of cash compensation. These 
results indicate that the governance proxy (TotGov) is positive and highly significant, 
indicating that firms with high takeover protection and CEO influence on governance are 
associated with a higher proportion of cash compensation. For CEOs that have exercised 
more options during the year, the proportion of cash is lower. This is consistent with these 
firms using more equity-based compensation to rebalance the CEO’s incentive structure. 
While tenure is not significant, the squared term is positive, suggesting that the proportion 
of cash compensation increases with tenure. This result is consistent with the Harvey and 
Shrieves (2001) findings. Firms with more investment opportunities (low B/M, high sales 
growth) use less cash in the CEO pay package. As expected, the proxy for size, log (assets), 
is negatively associated with the proportion of cash pay. Finally, CEOs with higher stock 
ownership receive a higher proportion of cash pay. 
 
When we use proportion of equity pay as our dependent variable, the results are 
also consistent with expectations. We find that the coefficient on total governance (TotGov) 
is significantly negative, implying that  firms with lower takeover protection and lower CEO 
influence in governance are positively associated with more equity-based pay in the 
CEO compensation package. We also find that more investment opportunities (lower B/M 
and higher sales growth) result in more equity-based pay; more option exercises imply more 
option grants to restore the optimal level of CEO option incentives, which increase the 
proportion of equity pay in CEO compensation; firms with excess cash flows tend to 
remunerate their CEO with more equity and less cash, to reduce the free cash flow problem; 
and larger firms grant more equity to the CEO. This is consistent with previous research. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that the optimal level of managerial ownership is positively 
related to firm size. Finally, CEO tenure is positively associated with more equity-based 
pay, but at a decreasing rate.  
 
 
4.4. Alternative specification with the change in CEO annual wealth 
 
So far, our tests have used total pay as the dependent variable. This is most 
consistent with CEOs exercising their bargaining power to write more favorable contracts 
when the governance structure provides more protection against the market for corporate 
control and gives the CEO more leverage over governance decisions. However, the results 
are also consistent with these governance structures protecting CEOs from market myopia 
and allowing them to focus on long-term value creation. While the bargaining power 
argument makes predictions about the design of the compensation contract, the protection 
argument makes predictions about CEOs’ incentive structure (including the compensation 
contract as well as changes to their portfolio).  
 
                                                 
9 The variables used in the selection model, in addition to the ones already included in the main regression, are 
the log of the market value of equity, the log of total sales, and the ratio of research and development 




To separate these two potential explanations, we use a specification similar to our 
main test (Table 3). However, the dependent variable is change in CEO annual wealth, 
which we define as total pay plus changes in the value of the beginning-of-the-year equity 
portfolio. This dependent variable is consistent with the protection argument but unrelated 
to the bargaining power argument. We measure changes in portfolio value as in Core et al. 
(2003). To capture the non-linearity associated with the changes in value of the stock 
options portfolio, we also include returns squared (Returns2) as an additional performance 
measure. Tests of incentive structure, which underlies the positive entrenchment argument, 
demands using the change in annual wealth as the appropriate dependent variable in the 
research design (Core et al., 2003).  
 
Table 7 presents the results.  Panel A provides descriptive statistics on changes in 
CEO wealth and the new dependent variable. On average, change in annual wealth is $21.95 
million, and governance structures where the CEO is better protected against takeovers and 
where he has more influence over the governance process have higher change in annual 
wealth.  
 
Panel B presents the multivariate model. As expected, Return and Return2 are 
highly significant, while accounting returns are insignificant. Book-to-market, relative 
noisiness of the performance measures, and CEO ownership are all associated with the 
weights that performance measures receive; however, governance is unrelated.
10 This 
evidence suggests that positive entrenchment firms (as proxied by TotGov) do not appear to 
use the weightings of these two measures to align CEO incentives with long-term value 
creation. However, the evidence is not informative about whether these firms use other 






CEO contracting is one of the most important tasks in corporate governance and, as 
such, it has been said to be a significant source of agency costs. Previous empirical evidence 
has documented the association between weak governance and higher levels of CEO 
compensation as well as with asymmetric rewards where CEOs are rewarded for favorable 
but uncontrollable events but are not penalized when events are unfavorable. In this paper 
we examine whether different governance structures are associated with different CEO 
contract designs. We run our tests using CEO pay and find that the weighting of accounting-
based performance measures is higher for firms with better takeover protection and where 
the CEO has larger influence on internal governance decisions. This evidence is consistent 
with the argument that weak governance allows CEOs to exerts their bargaining power to 
write favorable contracts. It is also consistent with CEOs exerting their power through the 
design of the contract rather than by directly raising their salaries. Because simply raising 
the salary—the most efficient way of capturing rents—is easily recognized and subject to 
reputation costs as it is not related to performance, CEOs in weakly governed firms increase 
the weight of controllable performance measures at the expense of more complete but also 
noisier measures. The result is robust to various definitions of accounting returns and to 
levels as well as changes in governance. Because an attractive characteristic of controllable 
measures is their lower level of noise, we extend the empirical study and examine the 
variance of CEO compensation and the proportion of cash compensation across governance 
regimes. Consistent with CEOs using their bargaining power to decrease the variance in 
their compensation, we find that the variance in CEO pay decreases, and the proportion of 
cash compensation increases with weaker governance.  
                                                 
10 For completeness we ran our main test (Table 3) including the variable Return2.  As expected, this variable 




This evidence indicates that one mechanism that CEOs use to exert the power that 
weak governance grants them is through the design of their compensation contract, 
favorable to them but sub-optimal (and a source of agency costs) from the shareholders’ 
perspective. Thus, these results provide evidence that explains how CEOs achieve the 
previously documented association between the level of CEO compensation and governance 
variables, including governance provisions and Board of Director characteristics.  
 
Finally, the paper examines the weights that these performance measures receive 
when contemplating the overall CEO incentive structure (including pay as well as changes 
in the value of the CEO’s portfolio). We find that the weights of these measures do not vary 
significantly across governance regimes. Positive entrenchment predicts that firms with 
better takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence over the governance 
process will align CEO incentives with long-term value maximization. A potential way to 
accomplish this objective is through the weighting of performance measures. The evidence 
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Table 1.  
Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: CEO compensation 
 
  Mean  Std.  Dev. Perc1  Perc25 Median  Perc75 Perc99 
Cash pay









1.330  1.215  0.167 0.578 0.963
***  1.600 7.500 










2.665  5.324  0.000 0.054 0.682 2.489 31.840 
Rest of pay
  0.487  1.821  -0.425  0.012 0.072 0.295 8.160 
Rest of pay 
(HPI governance)
 + 






** 1.797  -0.726  0.011 0.062
*** 0.285  7.966 
Total pay










** 6.663  0.260 1.044 2.101 4.696 40.942 
 
 
Panel B. Changes in CEO compensarion 
 
  Mean  Std.  Dev. Perc1  Perc25 Median  Perc75 Perc99 
∆ log (cash pay)  0.058  0.348  -1.120  -0.060  0.066  0.211  1.087 
∆ log (total pay)  0.105  0.685  -2.165  -0.172  0.101  0.411  2.209 
 
+ HPI governance indicates High anti-takeover Protection and High CEO Influence on governance. 
++ LPI governance indicates Low anti-takeover Protection and Low CEO Influence on governance. 
The sample consists of 6,536 CEO-year observations of Execucomp data (1,879 CEOs) for the years 1993-
2002. All amounts in Panel A are in $ million. Cash pay is defined as the sum of annual salary and bonus. 
Equity-based pay is the sum of annual grants of stock options and restricted stock. Total pay includes cash pay, 
stock options, restricted stock, long-term incentive plan payouts, and all other annual compensation. Rest of 
pay is defined as total pay minus cash pay and equity-based pay. The sample is divided into two groups 
according to their corporate governance structure. We measure corporate governance using a summary 
measure of total governance (TotGov) that includes indicators of anti-takeover  protection and characteristics 
of the Board of Directors, as defined in Section 3.2. HPI (LPI) governance indicates that the observation has a 
total governance score above (below) the median of TotGov. The variables have been winsorized at the 1 and 
99 percentiles. 
†
  The symbols 










Panel C: Governance variables 
 
  Mean  Std. Dev.  Perc1  Perc25 Median Perc75 Perc99 
Anti-takeover  protection 
index  9.289  2.727  4 7 9  11  15 
Number  of  meetings    7.203  2.953  3 5 7 9  16 
Executives  on  the  board  (%) 34.29 18.60 11.11 20.00 33.33 42.86  100 
CEO is also chair of board  0.799  0.400  0  1  1  1  1 




Panel D: Economic variables 
 
  Mean Std.  Dev.  Perc1 Perc25  Median  Perc75 Perc99 
∆ROA  -0.007 0.054 -0.242  -0.020 -0.001 0.013 0.169 
Return  0.064 0.399 -1.264  -0.143 0.085 0.299 1.137 
Std. Dev(∆ROA)  0.040 0.045 0.002 0.012 0.025 0.048 0.263 
Std. Dev(Return)  0.431 0.356 0.073 0.219 0.326 0.503 2.196 
B/M  0.650 0.261 0.104 0.451 0.671 0.861 1.215 
Var(∆ROA) / Var(Return)  0.027 0.117 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.018 0.398 
CEOshares 0.030  0.067  0.000 0.001 0.004 0.019 0.339 
Fair value options exercised         
($ million)  .1901 6.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.772  43.845 
Free cash flow problem  0.003 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.092 
CEO tenure (years)  10.6 7.3  3.1 5.2  8.4 13.4  38.0 
Log (Assets)  7.665 1.708 4.284 6.404 7.488 8.813  12.201 
Sales  growth  0.102 0.214 -0.654  0.012 0.085 0.185 0.849 
 
Governance Index is the governance index compiled by Gompers et al. (2003) to capture the level of anti-
takeover  protection. TotGov combines the four governance proxies into a summary measure of total 
governance by taking the average of the standardized variables, after controlling for firm characteristics as 
explained in Section 3.2. To perform this computation, number of meetings is reverse coded. ∆ROA is the 
change in return on assets, where ROA is operating income divided by average total assets. Return is the 
log(annual return + 1), where annual return is the continuously compounded monthly CRSP return over the 
firm’s fiscal year. Std. Dev(∆ROA) is the standard deviation of ∆ROA measured with five consecutive annual 
observations spanning years t-4 to t. Std. Dev(Return) is the standard deviation of Return measured with five 
consecutive annual observations spanning years t-4 to t. B/M is the ratio of book value of assets to market 
value of assets measured at the beginning of the period. The market value of assets equals the market value of 
equity plus the book value of total liabilities. Var(∆ROA) / Var(Return) is the ratio of the variances of ∆ROA 
and Return. CEOshares is the percentage CEO ownership.  Fair value options exercised is the fair value of the 
stock options exercised by the CEO in the year. Free cash flow problem is the three-year average of 
[(operating cash flow minus preferred and common dividends)/total assets] if the book-to-market ratio is 
greater than or equal to one, and zero otherwise. CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has been in 
office. Log (Assets) is the log of total assets (in millions) at fiscal year-end. Sales growth is defined as the 
change in the log of total annual sales. With the exception of the governance variables, all the variables have 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Performance metrics, governance and compensation 
 
    CEO compensation variable 
            
  Predicted sign  ∆ log (cash pay)    ∆ log (total pay) 
1.118  ***   0.811  *  ∆ ROA  + 
(0.193)     (0.434)   
0.1957  ***   0.346  ***  Return + 
(0.028)     (0.064)   
0.003     0.008    TotGov ? 
(0.009)     (0.019)   
0.520  ***   1.031  ***  ∆ ROA * TotGov  + 
(0.204)     (0.405)   
-0.020     -0.036    Return * TotGov  – 
(0.028)     (0.051)   
0.048  **   -0.113  ***  B/M   ? 
(0.019)     (0.042)   
1.428  ***   1.164    ∆ ROA * B/M  + 
(0.340)     (0.712)   
0.055     -0.025    Return * B/M  – 
(0.043)     (0.092)   
0.040     0.014    Var(∆ ROA)/Var(Return)  ? 
(0.0337)     (0.055)   
-1.174  ***   -0.691  *  ∆ ROA * Var(∆ ROA)/Var(Return)  – 
(0.240)     (0.390)   
-0.188     -0.148    Return * Var(∆ ROA)/Var(Return)  + 
(0.151)     (0.212)   
CEOshares ?  -0.005     -0.014   
   (0.004)     (0.009)   
∆ ROA * CEOshares  +  -0.243  **   -0.121   
   (0.106)     (0.218)   
Return * CEOshares  –  -0.007     0.020   
   (0.014)     (0.027)   
          
Adjusted R
2   0.199     0.061  
N     6,536        6,536    
 
∆ log (cash pay) is the change in cash pay. ∆ log (total pay) is the change in total pay. Return is the log(annual 
return + 1). ∆ROA is the change in return on assets.  TotGov combines the four governance proxies defined in 
Table 1. B/M is the ratio of book value of assets to market value of assets at the beginning of the period. 
Var(∆ROA) / Var(Return) is the ratio of the variances of ∆ROA and Return. The variances are computed with 
five consecutive annual observations spanning years t-4 to t. CEOshares is the percentage CEO ownership. 
Intercept, two-digit SIC industry and year dummies included but not reported. The standard errors reported in 
parentheses are based on the Huber-White estimator, which is robust to both serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity (Rogers, 1993). The symbols 






Performance metrics, change in governance and compensation 
 
    CEO compensation variable 
            
 Predicted  sign  ∆ log (cash pay)    ∆ log (total pay) 
0.985  ***   0.536    ∆ ROA  + 
(0.186)     (0.444)   
0.196  ***   0.331  ***  Return + 
(0.028)     (0.065)   
0.022     0.007    ∆ TotGov  ? 
(0.021)     (0.036)   
0.716     2.618  ***  ∆ ROA * ∆ TotGov  + 
(0.447)     (0.878)   
-0.025     -0.075    Return * ∆ TotGov  – 
(0.063)     (0.107)   
0.048  **   -0.120  ***  B/M   ? 
(0.019)     (0.042)   
1.674  ***   1.676  **  ∆ ROA * B/M  + 
(0.336)     (0.716)   
0.043     -0.007    Return * B/M  – 
(0.043)     (0.093)   
0.041     0.021    Var(∆ ROA)/Var(Return)  ? 
(0.033)     (0.056)   
-1.187  ***   -0.740  *  ∆ ROA * Var(∆ ROA)/Var(Return)  – 
(0.252)     (0.408)   
-0.1748     -0.122    Return * Var(∆ ROA)/Var(Return)  + 
(0.149)     (0.211)   
CEOshares ?  -0.004     -0.013   
   (0.005)     (0.010)   
∆ ROA * CEOshares  +  -0.162     -0.036   
   (0.102)     (0.231)   
Return * CEOshares  –  -0.017     0.014   
   (0.015)     (0.029)   
          
Adjusted R
2   0.200     0.062  
N     6,437        6,437    
 
 
∆ log (cash pay) is the change in cash pay. ∆ log (total pay) is the change in total pay Return is the log(annual 
return + 1), where annual return is the continuously compounded monthly CRSP return over the firm’s fiscal 
year. ∆ROA is the change in return on assets. ∆TotGov is the change in TotGov from year to year. This 
variable is a proxy for total governance and combines the four governance indicators defined in Table 1. B/M 
is the ratio of book value of assets to market value of assets measured at the beginning of the period. 
Var(∆ROA) / Var(Return) is the ratio of the variances of ∆ROA and Return. The variances are computed with 
five consecutive annual observations spanning years t-4 to t. CEOshares is the percentage CEO ownership. 
Intercept, two-digit SIC industry and year dummies included but not reported. The standard errors reported in 
parentheses are based on the Huber-White estimator, which is robust to both serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity (Rogers, 1993). The symbols 






Governance and variance in CEO compensation 
 





Log (cash pay) 
Standard 
deviation of 
Log (total pay) 
Standard 
deviation of 
∆Log (cash pay) 
Standard 
deviation of 
∆Log (total pay) 
HPI governance 0.285  0.487  0.289  0.566 




Each cell contains the mean of the standard deviation of CEO pay. To compute the standard deviation, we 
impose the restriction of having four or more consecutive observations (N=751).  Cash pay includes annual 
salary and bonus. Total pay includes cash pay, stock options, restricted stock, long-term incentive plan 
payouts, and all other annual compensation. Then, we compute the mean of the standard deviations by 
governance group. HPI (LPI) governance indicates that the CEO’s firm has a total governance score above 
(below) the median of TotGov. This variable is a proxy for total governance and combines the four governance 
indicators defined in Table 1 into a summary measure of total governance. Higher values of TotGov are 
associated with poorer governance. The symbols 
***, **, * indicate that the means are different at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level respectively. 
 
 





∆Log (cash pay) 
Standard 
deviation of 
∆Log (total pay) 
TotGov   -0.003 
 (0.016) 
 -0.  076 
** 
 (0.030) 






























2   0.123   0.135 
N.  observations   751  751 
 
The sample consists of CEOs with four or more consecutive observations.  TotGov combines the four 
governance proxies defined in Table 1. B/M is the ratio of book value of assets to market value of assets at the 
beginning of the period. Var(∆ROA) and Var(Return) are the variances of ∆ROA and Return. CEOshares is the 
percentage CEO ownership. Intercept and two-digit SIC industry dummies included but not reported.  The 
standard errors reported in parentheses are based on the Huber-White estimator, which is robust to both serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity (Rogers, 1993).  The symbols 
***, **, * indicate two-tail significance at the 





Governance and structure of CEO compensation 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Mean Std.  Dev.  Perc1 Perc25  Median  Perc75  Perc99 
Cash pay / Total pay  0.534  0.275 0.036 0.312 0.515 0.747 1.000 
Cash pay / Total pay (HPI gov.)  0.539 0.268 0.042 0.329 0.521 0.744 1.000 
Cash pay / Total pay † (LPI gov.)  0.529*  0.283 0.036 0.292 0.509 0.750 1.000 
Equity pay/Total pay  0.374  0.291 0.000 0.090 0.362 0.607 0.973 
Equity pay/Total pay (HPI gov.)  0.364 0.278 0.000 0.114 0.352 0.572 0.960 
Equity pay/Total pay † (LPI gov.)  0.385***  0.303 0.000 0.068 0.374**  0.635 0.973 
† The symbols 
***, **, * indicate that the means (medians) are different at the 1%, 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
Panel B: Governance and pay mix 




Proportion of cash 
pay to total pay 
  Proportion of equity 
pay to total pay 
          
TotGov  + / –    0.066  ***    -0.056  *** 
     (0.016)      (0.014)   
Fair value of options exercised  – / +    -0.017  ***    0.005  *** 
     (0.002)      (0.001)   
Free cash flow problem  – / +    -1.082  **    2.842  *** 
     (0.552)      (0.802)   
Log (assets)  – / +    -0.107  ***    0.0324  *** 
     (0.006)      (0.007)   
B/M  + / –    0.624  ***    -0.545  *** 
     (0.041)      (0.048)   
CEOshares  + / –    0.036  ***    0.021  ** 
     (0.011)      (0.010)   
Sales growth  – / +    0.010      0.076  * 
     (0.042)      (0.043)   
CEO tenure  ?    -0.001      0.013  *** 
     (0.004)      (0.003)   
CEO tenure-squared  + / –    0.0003  ***    -0.0002  ** 
     (0.0001)      (0.0001)   
Adjusted R
2     0.270         
N. observations      6,535     6,534   
N. uncensored observations          5,131   
Wald chi-square test of zero slopes        1017.40   
Wald test p-value          0.000  
Proportion of cash pay to total pay is defined as log(cash pay / total pay). Proportion of equity pay to total pay 
is defined as log(equity pay / total pay). B/M is the ratio of book value of assets to market value of assets at the 
beginning of the period. Fair value options exercised is the fair value of the stock options exercised by the 
CEO in the year. Free cash flow problem is the three-year average of [(operating cash flow minus preferred 
and common dividends)/total assets] if the book-to-market ratio is greater than or equal to one, and zero 
otherwise. CEOshares is the percentage CEO ownership. CEO tenure is the number of years the CEO has 
been in office. Log (Assets) is the log of total assets at fiscal year-end. Intercept, industry and year dummies 
included but not reported. The standard errors reported in parentheses are based on the Huber-White estimator, 
which is robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Rogers, 1993). The symbols 
***, **, * indicate 





Performance metrics, governance and compensation 
 







 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Perc1  Perc25  Median  Perc75  Perc99 
(∆ Wealtht / ∆ Wealtht-1)-1 0.482  2.943  -5.557  -1.054  0.060  1.426  14.20 
 
 
Change in annual wealth is the change in total CEO wealth defined as total pay plus changes in the value of 
the beginning-of-the-year CEO’s portfolio of company securities. High (low) entrenchment indicates that the 
CEO’s firm has a total governance score above (below) the median of TotGov. This variable is a proxy for the 
level of governance and combines the four governance indicators defined in Table 1 into a summary measure 




 Mean  Std.  Dev.  Perc1  Perc25  Median  Perc75  Perc99 
Change in annual wealth  21.953  98.448  -177.24  -0.135  3.046  13.077  606.902 
Change in annual wealth 
(high entrenchment) 
23.273 99.340  -119.67 0.095  3.170  12.724 606.902 
Change in annual wealth 
(low entrenchment) 





Panel B: Multivariate results 
 
Dependent variable:   
(∆ Wealtht / ∆ Wealtht-1)-1 
0.108   ∆ ROA 
(0.748)  
8.370  ***  Return 
(0.138)  
Return2 3.792  *** 
 (0.190)   
-0.018   TotGov 
(0.038)  
0.138   ∆ ROA * TotGov 
(0.738)  
0.034   Return * TotGov 
(0.126)  
Return2 * TotGov  0.116   
 (0.192)   
0.046   B/M  
(0.082)  
2.171   ∆ ROA * B/M 
-1.359  
-3.275  ***  Return * B/M 
(0.212)  
Return2 * B/M  -0.764  ** 
 (0.303)   
-0.088   Var(∆ ROA)/Var(Return) 
(0.113)  
-2.433  ***  ∆ ROA * Var(∆ ROA)/Var(Return) 
(0.889)  
-3.638  ***  Return * Var(∆ ROA)/Var(Return) 
-1.177  
Return2 * Var(∆ ROA)/Var(Return)  -2.679  *** 
 -1.047   
CEOshares -0.132  *** 
  (0.018)  
∆ ROA * CEOshares  0.324   
  (0.339)  
Return * CEOshares  1.119  *** 
  (0.056)  
Return2 * CEOshares  0.494  *** 
 (0.098)   
Adjusted R
2 0.866   
N 6,478   
 
∆ Wealth is the change in total wealth (total pay plus changes in the value of company securities in the CEO 
portfolio). Return is the log(annual return + 1). Return2 is returns squared. ∆ROA is the change in return on 
assets.  TotGov combines the four governance proxies defined in Table 1. B/M is the ratio of book value of 
assets to market value of assets at the beginning of the period. Var(∆ROA) / Var(Return) is the ratio of the 
variances of ∆ROA and Return. The variances are computed with five consecutive annual observations 
spanning years t-4 to t. CEOshares is the percentage CEO ownership.  Intercept, two-digit SIC industry and 
year dummies included but not reported. The standard errors reported in parentheses are based on the Huber-
White estimator, which is robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Rogers, 1993). The symbols 
***, **, * indicate two-tail significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level. 